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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 19064

GEORGE ALBERT ROYBAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in admitting the ruler and

substitute knife into evidence?
2.

Did the evidence of defendant's intoxication negate

the required intent for aggravated assault?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-306 (1953), as amended:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a
defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication negates the existence of the
mental state which is an element of the
offense •
Utah Code Annotated§ 76-5-102 (1953), as amended:
Assault is Cal An attempt, with
unlawful force or violence to do bodily
injury to another; or
Cb) A threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, George Albert Roybal, was charged by
H1lormation with Aggravated Assault, a Felony of the Third Degree,
ir,

violation of

§

76-5-103, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), as amended.

After a trial by jury on February 24, 1983, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding, the defendant was convicted
of Aggravated Assault.

On February 25, 1983, defendant was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years to be
served at the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on December 29, 1982 (T.
191, Phillip Sebastian, a cab driver for Salt Lake Taxi Co. (T.
161, was directed by two of his customers to go to the Bottoms Up
Lounge (T. 171.

They told him to wait for them (T. 191.

About

fifteen minutes later, when the bar closed at 1:00 a.m., they came
out with four other men CT. 191.

Two men sat in the front with

Mr. Sebastian, while the others sat in the back (T. 191.
Mr. Sebastian assumed they had been drinking (T. 48),
but the two men in the front seat did not seem to be drunk CT.
501 •

One of the two men in the front was the defendant, George

Albert Roybal, who sat next to Mr. Sebastian CT. 20, 211.
After taking the original passenger home (T. 231, Mr.
Sebastian took the remaining back seat passenger back to the
Bottoms Up.
CT. 271.

He was travelling on Sixth West Street going south

As they came to the intersection at Sixth West and Third

North, Roybal, the defendant, pulled out a Buck knife with an
approximately 5" blade CT. 27, 28).
recovered.

The other

This knife was never

man in the front seat also had a knife, and

pulled it right after the defendant did (T. 36).

-2-

Mr. Sebastian stopped as he saw the knife being pulled
The defendant had turned his body a little to the left.

wt.

He

;sked Mr. Sebastian if he wanted to die, if he was ready to die.
the'

defendant acted very threatening (T. 31, 63).

told him, "Hey, don't do it.
Just don't cut me up."

Take the car.

Mr. Sebastian

Take all my money.

Sebastian held his hands up, palms forward

'T. 33) and begged for his life (T. 64).
The defendant held the knife 6"-10" away from Mr.
Sebastian's chest and switched the knife around (T. 32, 56).

Mr.

Sebastian's hand was pricked sometime during the incident, but he
was uncertain whether the knife caused the injury.

Still,

Sebastian had not come in contact with anything else which could
have caused it (T. 56).
Then the black man in the back started speaking.
defendant turned his head to listen.
opportunity to jump out (T. 33).
stceet.

He was afraid (T. 34).

and pounded on the door

CT. 34).

The

Mr. Sebastian took that

He ran extremely fast up the
He ran up to a well-lighted house
A couple answered the door and

let him in. j The woman telephoned the police (T. 35).
Sebastian described the assailants to the dispatcher.

Mr.
He told him

there were two guys with knives.
Officer Bruce Jacobsen of the Salt Lake Police
Depattment CT 65) arrived at the house (where Mr. Sebastian had
f1ec1'
'"' f

10-12 minutes later.

The officer wanted Mr. Sebastian to

two men he had apprehended a block away.
defendant.

"cen lltinking,

One of these men

In the officer's opinion, the defendant had

but was not intoxicated (T. 79, 80).
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The

defendant's coordination was fairly good.

His speech was not

impaired, and he understood what the officer was telling him (T,
101, 102).
The officer drove Mr. Sebastian to the site where the
two men were apprehended (T. 36, 72).

The defendant was sitting

in a police car CT. 62), and the black man was outside of it.
Sebastian was 20'-30' from the defendant.
visibility.

Mr.

He had excellent

There were bright lights on inside the defendant's

car CT. 39).
Mr. Sebastian identified the defendant by pointing at
him and saying, "That's the guy right there.

You can haul him off

and never let him out of jail" (T. 40).
After the police got all the information they needed
from Mr. Sebastian, Sebastian took the cab back to the garage.
The police, however, called Sebastian five to ten minutes later
and informed him they had picked up the other
believed pulled the second knife.

men who they

Mr. Sebastian could not

identify him CT. 44).
At defendant's trial, the only major factual dispute
concerned defendant's sobriety.

Although both the arresting

officer and Mr. Sebastian agreed that the defendant was not
intoxicated CT. 50, 79, 60), defendant's companions testified that
he was CT. 106, 119).

Both of defendant's companions, however,

were friends of his and had been convicted of several prior
felonies CT. 103, 106, 111, 119, 124).
The only evidence concerning defendant's intoxicated
state came from Officer Phil Terry, who was the booking officer
-4-

IT. 145).
: h 0 ught

He identified the defendant (T. 151) and said that he

that defendant was intoxicated.

He said defendant was

"ery boisterous, and was yelling at the officers.

Mr. Terry

,[1dlled defendant had a difficult time standing still and ran
words together CT. 153).
i<as

The officer explained, however, that he

booking others at the time CT. 157).
The defendant also objected to the introduction into

evidence of a substitute knife and a ruler CT. 12, 13, 45).

The

prosecution introduced these items for strictly demonstrative
purposes (T. 12, 13).
SUMMARY OF AEGUM£NTS
The trial court correctly allowed into evidence the
substitute knife and ruler.

This demonstrative evidence was

helpful to the jury in understanding the circumstances surrounding
the assault.

Even if the evidence should not have been admitted,

no prejudice occurred.
Defendant's argument that his intoxication negated the
intent required for aggravated assault is without merit.
Intoxication does not negate the general intent requirement of
aggravated assault and there is no reason to exempt the facts of
this case from that requirement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE RULE AND
SUBSTITUTE KNIFE INTO EVIDENCE.
The victim testified that the defendant threatened him
•,'1th

a Buck knife having an approximately 5" blade (T. 29) •

kr.ife was not recovered after

the assault.
-5-

The

The State therefore

proffered a substitute knife and a ruler into evidence for
demonstrative purposes only (T. 14, 45).
Defendant contends, however, that admission of these
items into evidence was prejudicial, and that the cumulative
effect of such evidence to the jurors, if not the individual ones,
warrants a new trial.

Defendant cites Rule 45 of the Utah Rules

of Evidence in support of his contention, which provides the
following balancing test:
Except as in these rules otherwise
provided, the Judge may in his
discretion exclude evidence if he finds
that its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk
that its admission will • • • (bl create
substantial danger of undue prejudice or
of confusing the issues or of misleading
a jury •
Defendant correctly points out that there must be an abuse of
discretion to reverse a trial court's admission of evidence.
Martiny. Safewa:,r Stores. Inc., Utah, 565 P.2d 1139 (1977).
There was not, and could not have been, an abuse of discretion in
the instant case, however, since the use of the knife and the
ruler as demonstrative evidence was in no way prejudicial.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency
to influence the outcome of a trial by improper means, or if it
appeals to the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise causes the jury to
base its decision on something other than established
propositions of the case.

Terry y, Zions

Institute, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 <1979).

-6-

Mercantile

Both the substitute Buck knife and a ruler did not
, ; s<' to the level of prejudice previously described.

The

, ",dence of the knife and the length of the blade were central to
t11>-· question of whether an aggravated assault occurred.

The

demonstrations regarding the length of the blade helped the jury
co understand the seriousness of the threat involved, while the

substitute knife was used by the victim to demonstrate how the
defendant positioned the knife and its proximity to his chest.
The jury drew the only logical and proper conclusion possible:
that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault.
Replicas of physical evidence are usually admitted
where the original item has been lost or destroyed, although the
admissibility of the evidence is of course within the discretion
of the trial judge.

Reaves y. Horton, 518 P.2d 1380, affirmed in

part, reversed in part, 516 P.2d 304 (Colo. App. 1973).
Duplicates of originals may be used when the nature and
properties of an article itself require consideration by a jury,
or where, as with models, the model tends to explain how an event
may have occurred.

Richy. Cooper, 380 P.2d 613 <Or. 1963).

In

the instant case, the duplicate knife and ruler were important in
est a bl i shi ng how the assault took pl ace and the level of threat
involved.

They helped the jury to understand why that particular

kind of knife, along with the verbal threats, made the assault
serious, and why the victim plead for his life and jumped out of
Lhe cab when the opportunity presented itself.
Defendant maintains, however, that the jury would
1°11eve that the substitute knife was actually the knife used in

-7-

the assault.

Although there is a potential for misperceptions

whenever substitute evidence is presented, these misperceptions
did not exist in the instant case.

The jury was fully aware that

the knife was a substitute knife to be used for demonstrative
purposes only and that the real knife was never recovered because
of the length of time spent arguing about the length and width of
the blade CT. 58, 59, 29, 30).

If the real knife had been

recovered, there would have been no need to have the ruler
admitted into evidence.

An example of a substitute weapon being

admitted into evidence is found in Rich y. Cooper,

In

the plaintiff sued a police officer for assault and battery
allegedly committed during the arrest.

The plaintiff sought to

have a "sap" similar to the one the defendant had used upon him
admitted into evidence.

The defendant objected to the

admissibility of the substitute evidence on the ground that it
was not the sap he used.
objection.

The trial court sustained the

On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff would be

entitled to have the sap admitted into evidence on re-trial,
unless material differences between the exhibit and the original
were shown to exist •
.RiJ;.h

demonstrates that admissibility of a duplicate

weapon into evidence outweighs the potential problem that the
jury would assume the duplicate to be the actual weapon •
.RiJ;.h

also demonstrates that substitute evidence is

considered relevant, contrary to the defendant's assertion that
it is irrelevant and advances no material fact.

However, the

evidentiary substitution's probative value, discussed above, is
-8-

that it demonstrates the kind of knife used in the assault, and
the manner in which it was used.

Such information is crucial in

,ctabishing the elements of aggravated assault.
requires an assault (as defined in

§

Aggravated

76-5-102, Utah Code

Ann., 1953 (as amended)) plus the intentional causation of

serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon.

The kind of

knife used and the length of the blade are important factors in
determining whether the knife should be considered a deadly
weapon pursuant to the statutory language.
Appellant cites .M.i:u..ti.n,

and Reiser y. Lohner,

Utah, 641 P.2d 93 (1982) for the proposition that irrelevant
evidence should not be admitted because it has no probative value
and may create confusion.

The State agrees with this principle,

but maintains that it has no application here.

The evidence was

relevant, which makes it easy to differentiate the two cases
cited above.
In M.a..r.t.in, the trial court excluded evidence of
weather conditions at an airport twenty miles away from the scene
of the accident at issue on the basis that its probative value
was slight.

In

the court excluded evidence which

did not cause the injury at issue.
Both of these cases discuss evidence that had no
bearing on the issues and was thus properly excluded by the trial
rourt.

These fact situations are quite different from the

instant case, where the evidence in question is critical to
the elements of the charge and was properly admitted into
evidence.

-9-

Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced when the
jury was allowed to measure five inches on the ruler.

He argues

that the victim could not accurately describe the length of the
blade.

The victim, however, was quite certain of the length of

the blade, and described it very precisely on several occasions.
He first estimated the length of the blade to be about five
inches long CT. 29), and then, using the ruler, narrowed the
length down to 4 1/2" to 4 3/4" CT. 30).

He stated once more

that the blade was four to five inches long, and that it was well
over four and under six inches CT. 59).
It would be difficult for any witness to be much more
exact than was Mr. Sebastian.

The defendant was not prejudiced

by the measuring procedure because the jury only received a
visual demonstration of what the victim's testimony had revealed.
The jury did not speculate needlessly regarding the length of the
blade.

No speculation was possible because the jury was told

almost exactly how long the blade was.
It is clear that neither the admission of the ruler
nor the substitute knife was in error.

This demonstrative

evidence was important in assisting the jury's understanding of
how the incident occurred.

Defendant contends, however, that the

admission of both pieces of evidence was error, and that even if
the individual errors were not sufficient to warrant a new trial,
the cumulative effect was.

Defendant cites Gooden v. State, 617

P.2d 248 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) to support the proposition that
numerous irregularities may justify reversal.

In Gooden,

prejudicial questions were repeatedly asked despite repeated
-10-

sostained objections.

The problems were compounded with

eiudicial closing comments made by the prosecution.
The problem with defendant's contention, however, is
,1,cit

numerous errors did not occur in the instant case.

The

rule has therefore been inappropriately applied here.
M0reover, any error that did occur was slight and would have not
have changed the outcome of the case.

Reversal will not result

merely because there may have been error and reversal occurs only
if the error is such that there was a reasonable likelihood that,
in its absence, there would have been a result more favorable to
the complaining party.

Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No.

1, Utah, 645 P.2d 608 (1982),

In the instant case, the result

would have been the same, even if the evidence had not been
admitted.

The evidence of the knife and the length of the blade

would have been admitted in any case.
The court properly admitted the ruler and the
duplicate knife into evidence because it was helpful to the jury
and was not prejudicial.

Defendant's contentions are therefore

without merit.
POINT II

THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATION
DID NOT NEGATE THE REQUIRED INTENT FOR
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
Defendant claims to have been very intoxicated at the
t1m" the incident took place.

In support of this contention,

rkfendant points out that the booking officer had made an entry
or, the booking sheet describing him as very intoxicated (T. 106,
l

j

9) •
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The overwhelming evidence, however, indicates that
while defendant had been drinking, he was not intoxicated.
victim testified that defendant was not intoxicated.

The

Officer

Jacobsen likewise testified that he was not intoxicated CT. 79,
80), and that the defendant's coordination was fairly good.

The

officer further stated that defendant's speech was not impaired,
and that the understood what the officer was telling him (T. 101,
102).
Because the defendant was not intoxicated at all, his
argument that intoxication negated the required intent is without
merit.

Even assuming, arguendo, that he was intoxicated,

however, defendant still had the required intent when he pulled a
knife on Mr. Sebastian.
Section 76-2-306, Utah Code Ann., ( 1953), as amended
provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense when "such
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is
an element of the offense."

Where the charge is aggravated

assault, caused by a deadly weapon or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury, however, the intent required is
merely a general intent.

State y. Potter, Utah, 627 P.2d 75

(1981); State y. Howell, Utah, 554 P.2d 1326 <1976).
Intoxication does not negate general interest.

In

State y, Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974), defendant
was convicted of aggravated assault.

On appeal, defendant

contended that the crime of aggravated assault is a crime that
requires specific as opposed to general intent.

The court held:

General criminal intent is implied
from the act itself while specific
-12-

intent is not.
In the instant case we
believe that the crime of assault of a
police officer is a crime of general
intent • .l.d. at 1244.
'!

'o

court went on further to state:
In general intent cases, once the
commission of the crime has been shown
th absence of general intent may be
shown by the defendant, but this is the
defendant's burden and voluntary
intoxication will not negate general
intent • .lJi._ at 1244.

A similar result was reached by this court in State v.
Jl.Q\i.cl.l,

In .H..oW..ell, the court held that the section of

the aggravated assault statute referring to the use of deadly
weapons requires only a general intent.
general

The court found this

intent to be met even though the defendant claimed

he was too intoxicated to know what he was doing.
In People y. Rocha, 92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372
(1971),

the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly

weapon and asserted as error that the crime of assault with a
deadly weapon was a crime which required a specific intent.
Therefore, his intoxication could be introduced to negate the
element of intent.

The court held that assault with a deadly

weapon is a general intent crime.
could not negate such intent.

Therefore, intoxication

The court stated:

[Tlhe criminal intent which is
required for assault with a deadly
weapon • • • is the general intent to
willfully commit an act the direct,
natural and probably consequences of
which if successfully completed would be
the injury to another. Given that
intent it is immaterial whether or not
the defendant intended to violate the
law or knew that his conduct was
unlawful. The intent to cause any
-13-

particular injury • • . to severely
injury another, or to injure in the
sense of inflicting bodily harm, is not
necessary." l..d.... at 376, 377.
Defendant contends, however, that the facts of
this case should require specific intent.

He maintains that

general intent should be required in cases where a deadly
weapon is held by a defendant but never used to threaten the
victim, as in Potter,

He distinguishes his own

situation by stressing that he intentionally used a weapon
and caused fear in his

victim, thus warranting specific

intent.
Appellant's contention, however, is groundless.
This fact situation is comparable to that found in ll..mLelJ.,
In Howell, the defendant had the intent to
use a deadly weapon and to cause fear in his victim.

The

Howell defendant, in fact, went further than the defendant in
the instant case and actually caused severe bodily harm to
his victim.

This Court held nevertheless that only general

intent applied.
The general intent standard should remain for
aggravated assault.

As the court

stated:

!Ilt would be anomalous to allow
evidence of intoxication to relieve a
man of responsibility for the crimes of
assault with deadly weapon or simple
assault which are so frequently
committed in just such a manner. l..d.... at
374.
When appellant states in his brief that he intentionally
assaulted his victim, he should not be allowed to go free
because of his voluntary intoxication.
-14-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of
the

court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

·
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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